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Abstract. Kevin Scharp’s influential work on the alethic paradoxes combines an extensively developed 
inconsistency theory with a substantial conceptual engineering project. I argue that Scharp’s inconsistency theory 
is in tension with his conceptual engineering project: the inconsistency theory includes an account of concepts 
that implies that the conceptual engineering project will fail. I recommend that Scharp revises his account of 
concepts, and show how doing so allows him to resolve the tension. The discussion is important for ongoing work 
on conceptual engineering. Firstly, it is important to get clear on whether Scharp’s conceptual engineering project 
is—or could be—successful. Secondly, the issues discussed herein may generalise to other conceptual engineering 
projects, such as explication and ameliorative projects. In particular, the discussion has implications for how 
conceptual engineers can think about concepts and their relation to how we use words. 
Key Words. Scharp. Conceptual engineering. Inconsistency theory. Truth. Concept. 
1. Introduction 
Consider the following sentence, λ: 
λ is not true. 
If λ is true then, given that λ says that λ is not true, it follows that λ is not true. But, if λ is not true 
then, as that is just what λ says, it follows that λ is true. So λ is true if, and only if, λ is not true. By 
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considering cases, an explicit contradiction can be derived. This is the liar paradox, one of many 
paradoxes involving truth and falsity—the so-called alethic paradoxes.  
Kevin Scharp’s influential work on the alethic paradoxes combines an extensively developed 
inconsistency theory with a substantial conceptual engineering project.1 An inconsistency theory, in 
the present sense, is any view on which TRUTH and/or related concepts are deemed to be, in some 
sense, inconsistent. According to Scharp, the alethic paradoxes show that TRUTH is inconsistent and, 
in consequence, TRUTH is unsuitable for various theoretical roles—such as playing the central role in 
a semantic theory for natural language. He subsequently engineers a team of replacement concepts—
ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH—to play such theoretical roles in place of TRUTH.  
In the present paper, I argue that Scharp’s inconsistency theory is in tension with his 
conceptual engineering project: the inconsistency theory includes an account of concepts that implies 
that the conceptual engineering project will fail. I recommend that, to deal with the tension, Scharp 
revises his account of concepts. I sketch one way of doing this, and show that the resulting account 
provides Scharp with the resources to resolve the tension.  
This discussion is important for ongoing work on conceptual engineering for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, Scharp’s conceptual engineering project is one of the principal examples of 
conceptual engineering in philosophy, and it is important to get clear on whether it is—or could be—
successful. If it is successful, then Scharp’s project illustrates this powerful methodology in action; if 
not, then it illustrates the pitfalls and problems that the methodology can face. Either way, there is 
much to learn. Secondly, the issues discussed herein may generalise. The specific tension that Scharp 
faces threatens to apply, if less acutely, to other conceptual engineering projects—such as explication 
and ameliorative projects—and the kind of resolution I suggest might be adapted to such projects. 
More precisely, the discussion will have implications for how conceptual engineers can think about 
concepts and their relation to language.  
I begin (§2) by sketching Scharp’s inconsistency theory and conceptual engineering project. I 
then (§3) develop the tension between these two aspects of Scharp’s view, before (§4) revising 
                                                     
1 See Scharp 2013, 2019. 
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Scharp’s account of concepts and (§5) resolving the tension. I close (§6) with some comments about 
how the discussion generalises. 
2. Scharp on alethic paradoxes 
2.1 The inconsistency theory 
According to Scharp, the alethic paradoxes arise because the concept TRUTH is inconsistent.  
Here, “inconsistent” is to be understood as a term of art. Scharp understands concepts to be 
constituted, in part, by principles. To say that a concept is inconsistent is to say that its constitutive 
principles are jointly inconsistent (with the set of all facts). For example, Scharp claims that all 
instances of the following two unrestricted schemas are constitutive of TRUTH: 
(T-In)  If 𝜙, then ⟨𝜙⟩ is true. 
(T-Out)  If ⟨𝜙⟩ is true, then 𝜙. 
Here and below, “⟨⋅⟩” is a name-forming device. Now, consider the biconditional obtained by 
substituting λ into (T-In) and (T-Out):  
(Tλ)  ⟨λ is not true⟩ is true if, and only if, λ is not true. 
While (Tλ) per se is not inconsistent, it is jointly inconsistent with the fact that λ is identical to ⟨λ is 
not true⟩. It is in this sense that, on Scharp’s view, TRUTH is inconsistent. 
A difficult question, which any theory along these lines must tackle, is what grounds the 
claim that a concept, c, has constitutive principles, P1,…,Pn. Call this the grounding question. It is 
standard to answer the grounding question by appealing in some way to conceptual competence. 
Perhaps, say, c has constitutive principles P1,…,Pn in virtue of conceptual competence with c being a 
matter of having the right kind of dispositions towards P1,…,Pn—dispositions-to-accept, dispositions-
to-believe, or something else.2 Or, perhaps, c has constitutive principles P1,…,Pn in virtue of 
                                                     




conceptual competence with c being a matter of standing in the right kind of cognitive relation to 
P1,…,Pn.3  
Scharp’s considered view is that these approaches to the grounding question are “a mistake” 
(2019: 445). 
Constitutive principles have little or nothing to do with competence or concept possession. If 
you were in a conversation where someone asserted ‘not all vixens are vixens’, you would 
probably wonder whether you mean the same thing by some of those words, but you would 
not infer that this person does not possess the concept of vixen. After all, if your interlocutor 
means something else by ‘vixen’, then this sentence isn’t about vixens. You can’t infer 
anything about the concepts possessed by this person. (p. 444) 
Scharp recommends an alternative approach. The intuitive idea is this: what grounds the claim that 
each instance of (T-In) and (T-Out) is constitutive of TRUTH is that, if someone were to deny an 
instance thereof, we would likely wonder what they meant by “true”. The details are worth spelling 
out. 
To begin, Scharp claims that there are two major modes of conversation. 
The first is regular (or transparent) mode, where the conversation goes along exactly as you 
would expect a well-behaved conversation to progress. The participants take turns making 
claims about the topic of conversation […]. But the second mode for a conversation is 
meaning reflection, where one or more participants questions whether everyone means the 
same thing by one or more of the words or sentences involved in the conversation. (2019: 439) 
Utterances of certain sentences can lead conversational participants to initiate this second mode of 
conversation. For example, if I were to utter:  
(1) French red wines tend to be hoppy, 
                                                     




you might question whether we mean the same thing by “hoppy”, initiating meaning reflection with 
respect to “hoppy”. Scharp calls the negations of such sentences constitutive sentences for a word for 
a person.4 That is, 
(2) French red wines don’t tend to be hoppy 
is a constitutive sentence for “hoppy” for you just in case: an utterance of (1) would lead you to 
initiate meaning reflection with respect to “hoppy”.  
Note that a sentence can be constitutive for different words for different people. Suppose that, 
were I to utter (1) to Anya, she would initiate meaning reflection with respect to “wine”. Then, on that 
supposition, (2) is a constitutive sentence for “wine” for Anya. And suppose that, were I to utter (1) to 
Catalina, she would not initiate meaning reflection at all. Then, on that supposition, (2) is not a 
constitutive sentence for “hoppy”, “wine” or any other word, for Catalina.  
Now, Scharp uses the idea of constitutive sentences for a word for a person to introduce 
constitutive principles for a word for a person. First, Scharp claims that some constitutive sentences 
(for a word for a person) are stronger than others. The harder it would be for you to accept my 
utterance of (1) without initiating meaning reflection with respect to “hoppy”, the ‘more constitutive’ 
(2) is for “hoppy” for you (2019: 439). According to Scharp, there is an important threshold here: if 
(2) is a sufficiently strong constitutive sentence for “hoppy” for you, then it meets the threshold and 
counts as a constitutive principle for “hoppy” for you; otherwise not. 
There are some obvious questions to ask about this threshold. In particular, we might ask 
where the threshold is (how strong must a constitutive sentence be to be a constitutive principle?) and 
why it is wherever it is (why is the threshold there?). There is an easy way to answer these questions: 
the threshold is in the lowest possible position, so that every constitutive sentence counts as a 
constitutive principle. This gives the threshold a determinate position and, given that the position is at 
an extremum, makes that position non-arbitrary. Now, Scharp does not intend to give these answers, 
                                                     
4 I assume throughout that ‘is the negation of’ is a symmetric relation, so that (for example) “grass is green” is the negation 
of “grass is not green”. 
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which is why he introduces a threshold rather than identifying the constitutive sentences as the 
constitutive principles at the outset. And, as such, he owes us his view on the matter. But, nonetheless, 
the existence of easy answers suffices for us to put these questions aside herein: Scharp can provide a 
principled location for the threshold, regardless of whether it is where he wants it to be. For ease of 
discussion, I henceforth put this issue aside, assuming that: P is a constitutive principle for w for x just 
in case a denial of P would lead x to initiate meaning reflection with respect to w. 
Scharp uses constitutive principles (for a word for a person) to ‘define’ concepts via an 
abstraction principle. 
For example, where x and y are lines, the direction of x = the direction of y iff x and y are 
parallel. This well-worn example features an abstraction principle for defining directions. […] 
We can utilize the same sort of principle to define concepts in terms of constitutive 
principles for words. If w1 and w2 are words, then, 
 (Concept) The concept expressed by w1 = the concept expressed by w2 iff the set of 
constitutive principles for w1 is identical to the set of constitutive principles 
for w2 […]. 
We treat this as a definition of ‘concept’. (2019: 440) 
Although Scharp does not make the point explicit, he subsequently takes the constitutive principles 
for w1, w2, to be constitutive principles for the concepts expressed by w1, w2, respectively.5 
Note that (Concept) as it stands does not account for the fact that constitutive principles for 
words are, on Scharp’s view, relativized to people. This relativization can be incorporated 
unproblematically: 
 The concept expressed by w1 as uttered by x1 = the concept expressed by w2 as uttered by x2 
iff the set of constitutive principles for w1 for x1 is identical to the set of constitutive principles 
for w2 for x2. 
                                                     
5 For example, after introducing (Concept), Scharp writes: “Now we have concepts and we know exactly how we know 
things about them—by knowing things about their constitutive principles” (2019: 440, my emphasis). 
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It follows that, on this view, ‘my concept of hoppiness’ might be slightly different to ‘your concept of 
hoppiness’. Scharp accepts this consequence and takes it to be unproblematic: speakers assume that 
they are expressing the same concept by a word until presented with evidence to the contrary 
(2019: 440); and different speakers can typically use their own concepts to interpret others with 
sufficient success to enable “quick and effective communication” (p. 441). For ease, I henceforth use 
“(Concept)” to denote this amended abstraction principle. 
Now, (Concept) implies the existence of individual concepts. Consider:  
(3) The concept expressed by “hoppy” as uttered by Mark = the concept expressed by “hoppy” as 
uttered by Mark iff the set of constitutive principles for “hoppy” for Mark is identical to the 
set of constitutive principles for “hoppy” for Mark. 
This trivial instance of (Concept) implies the existence of ‘my concept of hoppiness’. To see this, 
notice first that it is a biconditional. So, if it is true, it follows that its left-hand side has a truth value. 
The left-hand side has a truth value, though, only if “the concept expressed by ‘hoppy’ as uttered by 
Mark” has a denotation. So, (3) implies the existence of a concept, call it HOPPINESSMARK, which is 
expressed by “hoppy” as uttered by me. On Scharp’s view, we take the constitutive principles for 
HOPPINESSMARK to be precisely the constitutive principles for “hoppy” for me. I say that 
HOPPINESSMARK is defined by abstraction over “hoppy” and me. 
We are now ready to state Scharp’s answer to the grounding question.  
A concept, c, has constitutive principles, P1,…,Pn in virtue of c being defined by abstraction 
over w and x, such that P1,…,Pn are the constitutive principles for w for x. 
Equivalently: 
A concept, c, has constitutive principles, P1,…,Pn in virtue of c being defined by abstraction 
over w and x, where denials of P1,…,Pn would lead x to initiate meaning reflection with 
respect to w. 
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Thus, for Scharp, the meaning reflection mode of conversation plays a central role in grounding 
claims about which principles are constitutive for a given concept. 
From this perspective, Scharp’s claim that ‘TRUTH is inconsistent’ must be interpreted as 
something of a generalization: there may be no unique ‘concept of truth’. We can easily make 
Scharp’s claim more precise. For each English-speaking person x, let TRUTHx be the concept defined 
by abstraction over “true” and x. Then Scharp’s claim might be restated along the following lines: for 
typical x, TRUTHx is inconsistent. In particular: for typical x, each instance of (T-In) and (T-Out) is 
constitutive for “true” for x. For ease of discussion, however, I make the simplifying assumption that 
there is a single concept, TRUTH, such that the denial of any of truth’s constitutive principles (in a 
conversation) triggers meaning reflection with respect to “true” (in that conversation). 
Before proceeding, let me highlight an additional feature of Scharp’s account of concepts that 
will be important below. According to Scharp, constitutive principles have normative import: they are 
“justified by virtue of their meanings” (2019: 442). In particular, speakers have a default and 
defeasible entitlement to constitutive principles; and there is a default and defeasible impermissibility 
to deny a constitutive principle. Scharp takes such normativity to play a role in guiding conversation: 
It is the warpings and tiltings of epistemic standards for various claims that is the contribution 
of constitutive principles. They act like the rails of a railroad track—guiding the direction of 
the conversation without dictating it. […] [C]onstitutive principles make it more difficult to 
take up certain positions and easier to take up other positions in a conversation. (2019: 443) 
Thus, on this view, the inconsistency of TRUTH can direct conversation towards incoherence (perhaps 
like a converging pair of rails on a railroad). When discussing such sentences as λ, the constitutive 
principles of TRUTH guide us towards asserting an impermissible sentence—namely, a contradiction. 
2.2 The conceptual engineering project 
Scharp claims that the inconsistency of TRUTH makes it unsuitable for use in inquiry: as 
terminological precision is required in inquiry, we want to safeguard against being guided towards 
impermissible claims. The problem is particularly stark in the field of truth-conditional semantics: 
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when we try to provide a truth-conditional semantic theory for a fragment of natural language that 
contains a liar sentence, it is almost impossible to avoid contradiction. So Scharp engineers two 
replacement concepts, ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH, by, in effect, stipulating their 
constitutive principles. Scharp intends these replacements to play the explanatory roles typically 
afforded to TRUTH. 
The guiding idea behind ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH is to split apart (T-In) 
and (T-Out). That is, each instance of the following unrestricted schemas is constitutive for 
ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH respectively: 
(A-In)  If 𝜙, then ⟨𝜙⟩ is ascending true. 
(D-Out) If ⟨𝜙⟩ is descending true, then 𝜙. 
For so-called safe sentences, such as those with no semantic vocabulary, ASCENDING TRUTH and 
DESCENDING TRUTH operate just like TRUTH: the converses of (A-In) and (D-Out) hold for such 
sentences, and thus the ascending and descending truth values of such sentences coincide. This 
contrasts with certain self-referential sentences, such as ‘ascending liars’ and ‘descending liars’: 
λA λA is not ascending true. 
λD λD is not descending true. 
It is easy to show that both λA and λD are ascending true and descending false. For such sentences, the 
converses of (A-In) and (D-Out) do not hold.6 
Now, the precise details of the proposal need not concern us here, but a few additional 
comments are in order. Firstly, the instances of (A-In) and (D-Out) do not exhaust the constitutive 
principles of ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH. Scharp introduces ASCENDING TRUTH and 
DESCENDING TRUTH by means of an axiomatic theory, ADT, which includes (A-In) and (D-Out) 
amongst other axiom schemas.7 As I understand the proposal, each axiom of ADT is a constitutive 
                                                     
6 E.g., while it is provable that ⟨λA is not ascending true⟩ is ascending true, we cannot infer that λA is not ascending true. 
7 For a full list of axioms, see Scharp 2013: 154. 
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principle for ASCENDING TRUTH and/or DESCENDING TRUTH. Importantly, ADT is provably 
consistent, and is (I think) jointly consistent with facts such as that λ is ⟨λ is not true⟩, that λA is ⟨λA is 
not ascending true⟩, and that λD is ⟨λD is not descending true⟩.8 That is, so defined, ASCENDING TRUTH 
and DESCENDING TRUTH appear to be consistent concepts. 
Secondly, Scharp does not provide a ‘background picture’ of these concepts to underpin or 
illuminate his axiomatization.9 The consequence is that, as things stand, it is difficult to get an 
intuitive grasp on what ascending truth and descending truth really are. Although this is potentially 
problematic (see Bacon 2019: 380–385), I only want to flag the issue here. At present, ASCENDING 
TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH can be understood to be technical concepts, whose most illuminating 
constitutive principles are the instances of (A-In) and (D-Out) respectively.  
Finally, Scharp does not claim that everyone should start using ASCENDING TRUTH and 
DESCENDING TRUTH in place of TRUTH all the time. The claim is rather that: the inconsistency of 
TRUTH causes certain problems in inquiry; and, in these problematic cases, we should use ASCENDING 
TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH in place of TRUTH. Scharp provides an in-depth example: truth-
conditional natural language semantics. In broad outline, the proposal is to replace ‘truth conditions’ 
with ‘ascending truth conditions’ and ‘descending truth conditions’. Thus, for each sentence s of a 
fragment of natural language, rather than yielding a theorem of the form: 
 s is true iff p, 
Scharp’s semantic theory yields a pair of theorems of the form: 
 s is ascending true iff p1, 
 s is descending true iff p2. 
For further details, see Scharp 2013: 207–215, 225–253. For critical discussion, see Pinder 
forthcoming-a. 
                                                     
8 For Scharp’s consistency proof, see his 2013: 178–187. Bacon (2019) also provides a simple model for ADT. 
9 Although see Scharp 2013: 200–203. 
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That, in broad outline, is Scharp’s conceptual engineering project. 
3. Tension 
The two aspects of Scharp’s view are in tension: the inconsistency theory includes an account of 
concepts that implies the failure of the conceptual engineering project.  
Consider the conceptual engineering project. Scharp intends to engineer consistent concepts 
that are suitable for use in inquiry, and then to use those concepts to develop a new approach to 
natural language semantics. To achieve this, Scharp needs to do two things. On the one hand, he needs 
to stipulate the constitutive principles for ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH. It is only by 
stipulating the principles that Scharp can ensure that the concepts are consistent. On the other hand, 
Scharp needs to use “ascending true” and “descending true” to express ASCENDING TRUTH and 
DESCENDING TRUTH. This is the mechanism by which Scharp uses those concepts to build a semantic 
theory.10 Drawing these points together, we can state a precondition of the success of Scharp’s 
conceptual engineering project: that he is able to stipulate the constitutive principles of the concepts 
expressed by “ascending true” and “descending true”. 
Turn now to Scharp’s account of concepts, which was developed as part of his inconsistency 
theory to answer the grounding question. On his account, a concept c has constitutive principle P only 
in virtue of c’s being defined by abstraction over a word, w, for which P is a constitutive principle.11 
And, importantly, whether or not P is a constitutive principle for w is an empirical matter, determined 
by whether or not the negation of P would trigger meaning reflection with respect to w. A direct 
consequence of these points is this: what the constitutive principles of the concepts expressed by 
“ascending true” and “descending true” are is an empirical matter. 
                                                     
10 These two things—stipulating constitutive principles for his concepts, and expressing them—are not necessarily tasks to 
be completed sequentially. As an anonymous referee points out, stipulating constitutive principles for a concept may require 
one to use a word to express that concept. The exact mechanisms in play here deserve further study, but this is not a task I 
can undertake here. 
11 For readability, I temporarily drop the relativization to people. 
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We can now state the tension explicitly. Consider the following question: 
(Q) What are the constitutive principles of the concepts expressed by “ascending true” and 
“descending true”? 
It is a precondition of the success of Scharp’s conceptual engineering project that he can stipulate an 
answer to (Q). But Scharp’s account of concepts implies that (Q) is an empirical question. And we 
cannot stipulate answers to empirical questions. So Scharp’s account of concepts implies that his 
conceptual engineering project will fail.  
Is there an easy way to resolve the tension? There are two obvious strategies that one might 
consider, neither of which are promising.  
First, Scharp might deny that his account of concepts implies that (Q) is straightforwardly an 
empirical question. He might claim: speakers are in control of when they initiate meaning reflection, 
so a speaker can decide what the constitutive principles for a given word are for herself. That is, 
Scharp might claim that he has the power to simply decide that he would initiate meaning reflection 
with respect to “ascending true” and “descending true” precisely whenever an interlocutor denies one 
of the axioms of ADT. If this is right, then he can a fortiori decide what the constitutive principles of 
the concepts he expresses by “ascending true” and “descending true” are. 
This strategy does not solve the problem, however. Scharp can very well intend to initiate 
meaning reflection whenever an interlocutor denies one of the axioms of ADT. But whether or not he 
would succeed remains an empirical question. Suppose that, during an intense debate with Scharp 
about his view, I denied one of the axioms of ADT. It is quite possible that Scharp, whatever his prior 
intentions, would not respond by reflecting on what I meant by “ascending true” and “descending 
true”—rather, he might suspect that I had made a logical mistake, or that I had forgotten the relevant 
axiom of ADT. Neither Scharp nor anyone else can know, without empirical investigation, whether he 
would initiate meaning reflection in such a case. The point here is this: according to Scharp’s 
inconsistency theory, constitutive principles are determined by which utterances would in fact trigger 
meaning reflection, regardless of one’s intentions. And that remains an empirical question. 
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The second strategy for resolving the tension is to deny that the success of Scharp’s 
conceptual engineering presupposes that he can stipulate an answer to (Q). Perhaps Scharp can accept 
that, in the end, it is an empirical question what the constitutive principles for the concepts expressed 
by “ascending true” and “descending true” are; and a fortiori that it is an empirical question what the 
constitutive principles for ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH are. The thought would be 
this: we cannot stipulate answers to empirical questions; but we can influence them. So, Scharp might 
seek to influence the occasions in which people initiate meaning reflection with respect to “ascending 
true” and “descending true”—and, if successful, then his conceptual engineering project would be 
successful. 
An initial problem facing this strategy is that Scharp does not intend to be the only theorist 
using ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH. The goal is for “a natural language, like English” 
to be supplemented with “an ascending truth predicate and a descending truth predicate” so that, 
whenever relevant precision is required, “conversational participants can switch from talk of truth to 
talk of ascending truth and descending truth” (Scharp 2013: 275). To achieve this on the present 
strategy, Scharp would need to influence a vast number of speakers to initiate meaning reflection 
whenever their interlocutors denied an axiom of ADT. Such a task would, I think, be almost 
impossible to complete. That is, if Scharp accepts that (Q) is an empirical question, then his 
conceptual engineering project will almost certainly fail.12 
A more fundamental problem, though, is that this strategy gives us the wrong success 
conditions for Scharp’s conceptual engineering project. On this strategy, the success of the project 
depends on Scharp’s ability to influence the occasions on which people would initiate meaning 
reflection. But consider the following scenario. Suppose that people start using “ascending true” and 
“descending true”, and that they try to use those words in accordance with the axioms of ADT. 
Amongst these people, suppose, is a collection of truth-conditional semanticists who begin to publish 
                                                     
12 Cappelen (2018) accepts that conceptual engineering (in general) is effectively impossible in practice, but that we should 
continue regardless. For responses, see e.g. Koch 2018 and Pinder 2018. As I doubt that Scharp shares Cappelen’s stance, I 
put Cappelen’s view aside herein. 
14 
 
research papers in which they provide ‘ascending truth conditions’ and ‘descending truth conditions’ 
in place of ‘truth conditions’. In such a scenario, Scharp’s conceptual engineering project has 
seemingly been hugely successful.  
But suppose that, in addition, a general practice develops in which people who accidentally 
contradict axioms of ADT are corrected for logical mistakes, and that meaning reflection is not 
triggered. Does this additional supposition undermine the success of Scharp’s project? On the present 
strategy for resolving the tension, the answer would be “yes”: as speakers would not initiate meaning 
reflection when an axiom of ADT is denied, they would not count as using ASCENDING TRUTH and 
DESCENDING TRUTH, and so Scharp’s project would count as having failed. But that is absurd: on the 
present scenario, speakers are trying to adhere to the axioms of ADT, and so they should count as 
using ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH in some relevant sense. Whether speakers initiate 
meaning reflection when an axiom is denied should be irrelevant. The success of Scharp’s conceptual 
engineering project should not be thought to turn on obscure facts about the occasions on which 
speakers would initiate the meaning reflection mode of conversation. 
4. Revising Scharp’s account of concepts 
Scharp’s account of concepts, as it stands, implies the failure of his conceptual engineering project. I 
recommend that Scharp revises his account of concepts. One way that Scharp might proceed is by re-
examining two key features of his account. 
The first key feature of Scharp’s account of concepts is its answer to the grounding question. 
Providing an answer is essential, because it justifies the claim that TRUTH is inconsistent. On Scharp’s 
view, the constitutive principles for TRUTH are the sentences the denial of which would trigger 
meaning reflection for “true”.  
The second key feature is the claim that constitutive principles guide how we use words. This 
claim is important because it explains why the inconsistency of TRUTH is a problem: TRUTH, in virtue 
of its inconsistency, will sometimes guide us towards asserting falsehoods. If constitutive principles 
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did not connect up with our linguistic behaviour in some such way, then it would be far from obvious 
that the alleged inconsistency of TRUTH was a problem.  
Let me re-examine these key features in turn, starting with Scharp’s approach to the 
grounding question. Scharp answers that question by appealing to an abstraction principle, (Concept). 
Now, Scharp intends us to interpret this principle as defining concepts. But another interpretation is 
also available: we could, instead, interpret (Concept) as defining concept expression.  
The distinction can be brought out by considering an unusual set of constitutive principles. 
Consider one of Scharp’s examples of an inconsistent concept, RABLE, whose constitutive principles 
might be characterised thus:13 
(4) all tables are rables. 
(5) no red things are rables. 
Let us suppose that, as a matter of fact, nobody initiates meaning reflection precisely when (4) or (5) 
is denied, with respect to “rable” or any other word. Now, consider the following question: Does there 
exist a concept, RABLE, whose constitutive principles are precisely (4) and (5)? If we take (Concept) 
to define concepts, the answer is no: concepts are nothing more than abstractions over words and 
speakers so, if (4) and (5) are not the constitutive principles for any word for any speaker, there is no 
concept constituted by the principles (4) and (5). In contrast, if we take (Concept) to merely define 
concept expression, then the answer is yes: concepts exist independently, and (Concept) defines only 
what it is for a concept to be expressed. 
What, on this picture, are concepts? To answer this question, we might interpret ‘constitutive 
principle’ both literally and minimally. That is, we might identify concepts with collections of 
                                                     




principles: any collection of principles, whether expressed by a word or not, is a concept.14,15 So 
construed, there exists a concept whose constitutive principles are precisely (4) and (5)—viz. the 
collection consisting of precisely (4) and (5)—and we can call that concept RABLE. And then, a 
speaker, x, expresses RABLE by “rable” just in case: whenever (and only whenever) faced with a 
denial of (4) or (5), x would initiate meaning reflection with respect to “rable”.  
Now, as noted, Scharp explicitly takes (Concept) to define concepts (2019: 440). However, 
this strikes me as a mistake. If (Concept) defines concepts, then the existence of ASCENDING TRUTH 
and DESCENDING TRUTH depends on there being speakers who initiate meaning reflection with respect 
to “ascending true” and “descending true” whenever axioms of ADT are denied—making the very 
existence of ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH an empirical question. This sits awkwardly 
with how Scharp thinks of his conceptual engineering project. He takes himself to have successfully 
engineered two consistent concepts, ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH, that he is now 
encouraging others to use. Making the existence of these concepts an empirical matter only confuses 
the issue. 
Instead, I suggest Scharp take (Concept) to define concept expression. Then he can accept 
that ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH exist independently of words and speakers, along 
with many other expressed and unexpressed concepts. From this perspective, Scharp has not created 
ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH: collections of principles can neither be brought into, nor 
eliminated from, existence. Rather, Scharp has picked them out by specifying their constitutive 
principles. It is in this sense that he has ‘engineered’ ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH. 
                                                     
14 Perhaps not every collection of principles should be deemed a concept. Perhaps the principles have to be related in a 
suitable way. For example, there may be no concept whose constitutive principles are 1+1=2 and moons orbit planets, even 
though the former might be constitutive of some concepts (e.g. NUMERICAL EQUALITY) and the latter of others (e.g. MOON). I 
put this issue aside, however. 
15 This is not a proposal for how to think of concepts qua constituents of thought, nor is the view a proposed competitor to 
(say) the theory theory of concepts or the prototype theory of concepts. Rather, this is a proposal for how to think about the 
principle-constituted entities that play a central role in Scharp’s theory. I put aside the (important) question of whether such 
entities ultimately deserve to be called “concepts”. 
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Had he specified different principles, ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH would still have 
existed, but Scharp would have picked out different concepts. What (Concept) tells us, from this 
perspective, is only whether speakers successfully express ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING 
TRUTH when using “ascending true” and “descending true”. 
I have suggested that Scharp take (Concept) not to define concepts, but to define concept 
expression. I have given some initial motivation for this revision, but the principal reason for the 
suggestion is that it will allow Scharp to respond to the tension raised above. Before we can see how it 
does this, though, I must re-examine the second key feature of Scharp’s account—that constitutive 
principles guide how we use words.  
As explained above, Scharp highlights one way that constitutive principles guide how we use 
words: via meaning reflection. If a speaker denies a constitutive principle, then this triggers meaning 
reflection; and a speaker accepting a constitutive principle will appear justified in virtue of the 
meanings of the words involved. In such a case, in light of my comments above, we say that the 
speaker uses the word to express the concept.  
Now, there are questions we might ask about the precise mechanisms in play here. In 
particular, it is unclear to me what grounds the normative nature of the constitutive principles, and 
how this normativity allows the principles to impact on linguistic behaviour. Regardless, for present 
purposes, let us assume that constitutive principles can guide how we use words in roughly the way 
Scharp envisages. 
This assumption notwithstanding, there are other ways that constitutive principles can guide 
how we use words. Consider, for example, the sense in which (A-In) and (D-Out) might guide our use 
of “ascending true” and “descending true”. In my case, at least, (A-In) and (D-Out) guide my use of 
those words in the sense that: I explicitly intend to adhere to Scharp’s characterisation of ASCENDING 
TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH; I know that his characterisation of those concepts appeals principally 
to (A-In) and (D-Out); and so I intend to adhere to those principles. For example, I take it as given 
that 
(6) if λA is not ascending true, then ⟨λA is not ascending true⟩ is ascending true, 
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but I take its converse to be something to be proved or disproved. This is an explicit attitude that I 
take towards “ascending true” and “descending true”, and it need have nothing to do with meaning 
reflection: if you deny (6), I am more likely to refer you to the relevant axiom of ADT than to 
question whether we mean the same thing by “ascending true”. 
In this way, constitutive principles can guide our use of words via an explicit intention. 
Importantly, the intention need not be directed at the constitutive principles themselves; neither (A-In) 
nor (D-Out) need be part of the content of my explicit intention for my use of “ascending true” and 
“descending true” to be guided in this way. I have an explicit intention to use “ascending true” and 
“descending true” in accordance with Scharp’s characterisation thereof. As Scharp’s 
characterisation principally involves (A-In) and (D-Out), those principles will guide my use of 
“ascending true” and “descending true” whenever I am acting on that intention with sufficient care. 
This may involve me recalling those principles from memory, referring back to the text, asking my 
interlocutor, or something else. Whatever the details, the constitutive principles count as guiding my 
use of the relevant words via an explicit intention. 
Let me make two brief points about being guided by constitutive principles via an explicit 
intention. Firstly, there is nothing unusual about being guided in this way. When authors of an 
academic, legal or medical text explicitly define a word, they typically expect their readers to 
intentionally interpret that word according to the given definition. When teaching logic to students, 
we encourage them to try to follow the relevant rules of inference precisely—and we intend to do the 
same when constructing proofs in our own research.  
Secondly, guidance via explicit intention cannot be reduced to guidance via meaning 
reflection. When an individual is guided via explicit intention, she might initiate meaning reflection 
when an interlocutor says something that contradicts the definition/rule of inference; but, equally, she 
might not. In many cases, she will assume that the interlocutor intends to use the word according to 
the definition/rule of inference, and that the interlocutor has simply made a mistake—a mistake which 
is easily remedied by pointing back to the relevant definition/rule of inference, but does not call for 
meaning reflection.  
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The suggestion, then, is this. Scharp should accept that there are multiple ways in which 
constitutive principles can guide the use of words. One way that constitutive principles might guide 
our use of words is via meaning reflection. Another way that constitutive principles might guide our 
use of words is via explicit intentions.16  
Now, when a collection of constitutive principles guides our use of a word via meaning 
reflection, I said above that we use that word to express the concept constituted by those principles. In 
light of the present revision, however, we can distinguish between two different ways that a word 
might be said to express a concept. When a concept guides our use of a word via meaning reflection, 
let us now say that we use that word to semantically-express the concept—this is what is defined by 
(Concept). And when a concept guides our use of a word via explicit intention, let us say that we use 
the word to speaker-express the concept.17 
Drawing the discussion in this section together, we obtain the following picture. Concepts are 
collections of principles. Some concepts guide how we use words. There are at least two ways that 
this can happen: via meaning reflection and via explicit intention. A concept guides a speaker’s use of 
a word via meaning reflection just in case denials of constitutive principles (and nothing else) would 
lead the speaker to initiate meaning reflection with respect to that word. The abstraction principle 
(Concept) tells us that, in such cases, the concept is semantically-expressed by the word in question as 
uttered by that speaker. When a concept guides a speaker’s use of a word via explicit intention, she 
intends to use that word in a certain way. She might intend to adhere to the constitutive principles of 
that concept directly, say if she intends to use “ascending true” in accordance with (A-In); or she 
might have a more general intention, such as to use “ascending true” in accordance with Scharp’s 
characterisation thereof. In such a case, the concept is speaker-expressed by the word in question, as 
uttered by the speaker. 
Let us now apply this picture to the tension raised in §3. 
                                                     
16 There may be other ways that constitutive principles can guide our use of words. I will not explore this possibility here. 




5. Resolving the tension 
How does TRUTH guide our use of “true”? It is unlikely that many speakers, when using “true”, 
explicitly intend to adhere to instances of (T-In) and (T-Out), nor to those of other related principles 
(such as the T-schema). Most speakers are not even familiar with such principles. So, of the two 
options sketched in the previous section, it is more likely that TRUTH guides our use of “true” via 
meaning reflection than via explicit intention. Let us assume that TRUTH does indeed guide our use of 
“true” via meaning reflection. 
How might ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH guide our use of “ascending true” 
and “descending true”? In contrast to “true”, most users of “ascending true” and “descending true” are 
presumably guided by their explicit intentions to adopt Scharp’s terminology, rather than by meaning 
reflection. So, of the two options sketched in the previous section, it is more likely that ASCENDING 
TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH guide our use of “ascending true” and “descending true” via explicit 
intention than via meaning reflection. Let us assume that those who use “ascending true” and 
“descending true” are indeed guided in this way. 
This contrast between TRUTH on the one hand, and ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING 
TRUTH on the other, allows us to resolve the tension raised in §3. When our use of a word is guided by 
a concept via meaning reflection, it is an empirical question what the constitutive principles of that 
concept are. For example, it is an empirical question whether Scharp is right that a denial of an 
instance of (T-In) will trigger meaning reflection for “true”. In contrast, when our use of a word is 
guided by a concept via explicit intention, the relevant constitutive principles can be stipulated. For 
example, Scharp picked out ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH by stipulating that the 
axioms of ADT should guide use of “ascending true” and “descending true”. If we are happy to co-
ordinate with Scharp, then we do so by intending to adhere to those axioms when we use “ascending 
true” and “descending true”. We then use “ascending true” and “descending true” to speaker-express 
ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH. 
It is worth emphasising the need for care on these points. On the present picture, concepts are 
collections of principles, and so have their constitutive principles essentially. If TRUTH is the 
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particular concept that in fact guides our use of “true” then, on the present picture: TRUTH has its 
constitutive principles essentially; but we must discover those principles, and thus the identity of 
TRUTH, empirically. So it is an empirical matter whether TRUTH is inconsistent in the sense that: it is 
an empirical matter which concept guides our use of “true” and, thus, it is an empirical matter whether 
our use of “true” is guided (via meaning reflection) by an inconsistent concept.  
Similar care should be taken with the claim that constitutive principles can be stipulated. If 
ASCENDING TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH are particular concepts, then they too have their 
constitutive principles essentially. But, nonetheless, Scharp can stipulate that he intends to use 
“ascending true” and “descending true” in accordance with particular constitutive principles; and, in 
doing so, Scharp is effectively stipulating which concepts are to guide his use of those words. One 
cannot stipulate what the constitutive principles of a particular concept are; but one can stipulate that 
one will use whichever concept has such-and-such constitutive principles. 
So, on the present picture, there is a clear sense in which it is an empirical question whether 
TRUTH is inconsistent; and there is a clear sense in which Scharp is able to ‘engineer’ ASCENDING 
TRUTH and DESCENDING TRUTH, by stipulating which concepts will guide his use of “ascending true” 
and “descending true”. 
Recall that, as presented in §3, the tension turned on the following question: 
(Q) What are the constitutive principles of the concepts expressed by “ascending true” and 
“descending true”? 
As Scharp sets up his view: it is a precondition of the success of his conceptual engineering project 
that he can stipulate an answer to (Q); but Scharp’s account of concepts implies that (Q) is an 
empirical question.  
It is clear where, according to the picture I have sketched, this goes wrong: Scharp does not 
distinguish between semantic-expression and speaker-expression. When we do so, we see that there 
are (at least) two ways to interpret (Q): 
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(Q1) What are the constitutive principles of the concepts semantically-expressed by “ascending 
true” and “descending true”? 
(Q2) What are the constitutive principles of the concepts speaker-expressed by “ascending true” 
and “descending true”? 
Now, the claim that the inconsistency of TRUTH is an empirical matter implies that (Q1) is an 
empirical question. On the other hand, the precondition of the success of Scharp’s conceptual 
engineering project is that we can stipulate an answer to (Q2).18 But, of course, there is no tension 
between the claim that (Q1) is an empirical question and the claim that we can stipulate an answer to 
(Q2). If Scharp adopts the picture sketched herein, the tension facing his account dissipates. 
6. Closing remarks 
The tension I have been discussing arises due to two of Scharp’s aims. First, he aims to diagnose a 
certain concept as deficient a posteriori. Second, he aims to stipulate improved replacements. At first 
sight, these two aims seem complementary: find something broken, then mend it. But care needs to be 
taken in spelling out how concepts can be subject both to a posteriori inquiry and stipulation. If care 
is not taken, then the aims end up in tension. This is just the problem that I raised in §3: Scharp spells 
out the empirical nature of concepts at some length, unintentionally ruling out the possibility of 
stipulating a replacement.  
Other conceptual engineering projects have similar aims. One set of examples are the 
ameliorative projects defended by, for example, Haslanger (2012) and Manne (2017). These projects 
aim to highlight an a posteriori deficiency in everyday concepts such as WOMAN, WHITE, and 
MISOGYNY, which purportedly have problematic social consequences, and then to stipulate and 
defend improved, revisionary definitions.  
                                                     
18 On this approach, then, conceptual engineering can be understood in terms of speaker-meaning. As I have defended the 
‘Speaker-Meaning Picture of Conceptual Engineering’ at length elsewhere (Pinder forthcoming-b), I will not consider 
objections to the approach here. 
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Another set of examples are those that employ the method of explication, typically associated 
with Carnap (1962) and Quine (1960). On one way of characterising the method, it involves replacing 
an imprecise concept, the explicandum, with a more precise alternative, the explicatum. Now, the 
imprecision of the explicandum is typically taken to be an a posteriori matter. This is hinted at by 
both Carnap (1962: 3–5) and Quine (1960: 238–239), but the point has been emphasised more 
recently by Shepherd and Justus (2015) and Koch (2019), who argue that experimental methods 
should be used to help clarify the explicandum, and by Schupbach (2017), who argues that the 
explicatum’s similarity to the explicandum should be tested empirically.19 Nevertheless, the 
explicatum is typically introduced by means of a stipulated definition or stipulated rules of use. For 
one example, Schupbach (2017: 692) suggests that we define an explicatum, EXPLANATORY POWER 





And Quine’s (1960: 237) principal example of an explication is the mathematician’s stipulated 
replacement of the ordinary notion of an ordered pair, effectively defined thus: 
If ⟨x ,y⟩ = ⟨z ,w⟩, then x=z and z=w. 
Explicators, then, are naturally construed as seeking to stipulate an improved replacement for a 
concept that has been diagnosed as deficient a posteriori.  
In light of the foregoing, we should ask: how are ameliorators and explicators understanding 
concepts, such that concepts so understood are subject both to a posteriori inquiry and stipulative 
definition? The general lesson from the present paper is that care must be taken here. If care is not 
taken, then the two aspects of the project may end up in tension—the ameliorator and explicator may 
end up diagnosing a deficiency that, by their own lights, cannot be fixed.20 
                                                     
19 I have objected to both of these projects elsewhere. See Pinder 2017a and Pinder 2017b respectively. 
20 Like Scharp, I doubt that ameliorators and explicators would endorse Cappelen’s (2018) view that their projects are 
worthwhile despite being almost certain to fail. (See note 12.) 
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I see no reason why ameliorators and explicators could not, in principle, follow a strategy 
similar to that developed in §§4–5. On this strategy, ameliorators and explicators alike might firstly 
adopt a theory of concepts as definitions or rules of use, and then provide a pluralist theory of how 
concepts so-construed can guide, or are expressed by, our use of words. Whether ameliorators and 
explicators would be willing to adopt the details from §§4–5 is less clear—if nothing else, both the 
identification of concepts as collections of principles, and the role of meaning reflection in 
determining which word semantically-expresses which concept, will no doubt be controversial. 
Nonetheless, the broad structure of the strategy certainly appears to be available for ameliorators and 
explicators alike. I leave it to individual theorists to provide precise details of how we can make sense 
of the dual a posteriori and stipulative nature of their projects.21 
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